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I. Introduction
It is a cardinal principle of United States policy that foreign companies
operating in this country should be subject to the same rules and regulations
which govern domestically owned companies. Foreign banks, however, because
they are subject to disparate state and federal legislation, have come to enjoy
certain competitive advantages and suffer some disadvantages relative to their
domestic counterparts. With the recent emergence of foreign banks as a factor
of importance in United States banking, these competitive inequalities have
assumed greater importance. In the past eighteen months a number of pro-
posals have been presented which would change the regulation of foreign banks;
these different and frequently conflicting approaches to reform provide an
appropriate opportunity to review the growth of foreign banking in the United
States together with the range of regulatory, constitutional and monetary issues
which this growth has created.
Foreign banks first established United States offices during the late nine-
teenth century. I However, there was no significant amount of foreign banking
activity in the United States until the 1920's.2 The most dramatic expansion of
foreign banking has occurred since 1960. Recent estimates of United States
assets of foreign banks approach $35 billion, representing approximately 41/2
percent of the $762 billion total assets held by domestic banks.3 Although 10
states presently authorize foreign banks to operate within their borders," most
*A.B. Columbia University; M.A.T., J.D., Harvard University. Associate in the New York City
firm of Davis, Polk & Wardwell.
'Johnson, Foreign Banking in the United States, 6 VA". J. TRANs. L. 595, 597 (1973).
2J. Zwick, Joint Economic Committee, Paper No. 9, Foreign Banking in the United States, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1966); Johnson, supra note 1, at 598.
3Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urgan Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [Hereinafter cited as 1974
Hearings]. Moreover, by the end of 1972, commercial and industrial loans extended to parties in the
United States by foreign owned banking institutions amounted to approximately $7 billion, or 8%
of such loans by large commercial banks.
'Gross, Compilation of Foreign Bank Activities in the United States, AMER. BANKER, July 31,
1973, at 11.
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foreign banking activity is concentrated in New York' and California . 6
A number of factors are responsible for the expansion of foreign banking in
the United States. Since foreign direct investment increased from $5.6 billion
in 1965 to $113 billion in 1971, 7 foreign banks responded to the expanded
United States operations of their corporate clients by setting up offices here
capable of providing a full range of banking and financial services. Another
important reason for opening United States offices has been the need of foreign
banks for dependable deposit bases of dollars to meet worldwide foreign ex-
change demands.'
Further, New York offices have given foreign banks direct access to the New
York money markets, particularly the market for call loans to securities dealers.
This access permits foreign banks to engage in various arbitrage operations
and other profitable financial transactions associated with the shift of funds
from the Euromarket to New York.9 A United States office also facilitates the
settlement on a daily basis of the parent bank's dollar transfers as well as those
of its customers. 10 One final motivation for the establishment of United States
offices has been the access such offices afford to the United States securities
markets. Acting through United States offices, foreign banks have been able
to underwrite new domestic security issues and invest for their own accounts
and those of clients. Additionally, through United States offices foreign banks
may offer their clients the sort of asset-management and investment advisory
services offered by United States banks and establish contact with major United
States institutional investors.
The operations of domestic banks and the United States offices of foreign
banks differ in significant respects. The principal sphere of activity of most
foreign banks has been the financing of international trade." Because foreign
banks engaged in international banking have difficulty in establishing a large
stable dollar deposit base, they have generally relied on funds supplied from
the home office, supplementing these resources by drawing on the United States
money market."2 A large share of the resources of foreign banks are used to
qlehr, Two Aspects of Federal State Relations: State Taxation of National Banks and Proposed
Federal Supervision of Foreign Banking, 84 BANK. L. J. 941, 954 (1967); Vestner, Trends and
Developments in State Regulation in Banks, 90 BANK. L. J. 464, 474 (1973).
'The Foreign Bank Invasion, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 15, 1973, at 113.
1Klopstock, Foreign Banks in the United States: Scope and Growth of Operations, MONTHLY
REV. (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), June, 1973 at 143.
'Bus. WEEK, supra note 6.
'Klopstock, supra note 7 at 146.
'*The daily volume of transfers involving foreign accounts in United States banks now exceeds $30
billion. Id., at 148. See generally, 1974 Hearings supra note 3.
"Zwick, supra note 2 at 16.
"
1 974 Hearings, supra note 3.
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make commercial and industrial loans in the United States which account for
approximately 40 percent of their assets, a substantially higher proportion than
for domestic banks belonging to the Federal Reserve. 3
Until recently foreign banks have preferred to concentrate on wholesale
banking and trade financing. In New York and also California, however, a
number of foreign banks have recently begun to move into retail banking,
assisted by state laws which permit statewide branching. 1 4 Foreign banks have
tended to expand their retail operations by merging with or acquiring United
States banks which already possess a number of retail branches. Examples of
such expansion include the acquisition by Lloyds Bank of California's 94-
branch First Western Bank, and the acquisition by Barclay's of the First West-
chester National Bank with 18 retail offices. Antitrust enforcement efforts
directed against domestic bank mergers have facilitated the entry of inter-
national banks into American markets. t s
The expansion into retail banking has provoked the most heated opposition
from small and medium sized independent banks who are facing increasingly
aggressive competition from foreign banks bidding for consumer business."
11. Organizational Forms Available to
Foreign Banks
Foreign banks seeking to enter the United States banking market may choose
among various forms, electing one or another depending upon the functions
to be performed and the flexibility afforded by individual state law. Repre-
sentative offices, subsidiaries, branches and agencies are the more important
available forms, and each has a distinct set of characteristics.
A. Representative Offices
Foreign banks have regarded the representative office as the most flexible
and least expensive means of entering a new banking market. Representative
offices are not permitted to perform any banking functions, but serve merely
as sales or service offices. In most states there is no regulation or supervision
of representative offices on the grounds that they are not directly involved in
banking functions; California, however, requires that representative offices
obtain a license. 17
13Id.
•
4Klopstock, supra note 7, at 145.
"AMER. BAxER, January 16, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
"Allen, United States: a Growing Bitterness by Small Operators Against Foreign Giants, The
Times (London), September 27, 1973 (Special Report: Japanese Banks), at IV, col. 4.
"Johnson, supra note 1, at 602.
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B. Subsidiaries
If a foreign bank intends to receive deposits subject to withdrawal it must
establish either a subsidiary or a branch. '8 Although most foreign banks prefer
to establish branches because they are structurally less complicated than sub-
sidiaries, a subsidiary may provide the onlyalternative for a foreign bank which
desires to engage in a broad range of banking activities where branching is
prohibited. 19 Banking subsidiaries may be chartered either under state law or
federal law, but since federal charters require that directors be United States
nationals, foreign banks have uniformly elected to operate under less restrictive
state charters. Although three states have issued charters to foreign banking
subsidiaries, 2 0 most have been formed in New York where they are primarily
engaged in performing corporate trust work. 2'
C. Branches
Branch banks provide a full range of trade financing facilities including
letters of credit, discounts, acceptances, collections, foreign exchange transfers
of funds, and remittances. Additionally, branches actively engage in fund
investments, commercial and personal lending and the solicitation of deposits."
In general, a branch affords the broadest range of permissible banking activities
of all forms, and foreign branches are offered banking privileges virtually
identical to those of domestic banks.22 They are also subject to a number of
the same restrictions which apply to domestic banks and are required to main-
tain the same fractional reserves against deposits, to abide by the same restric-
tions and limitations regarding loans, and to comply with the same rate ceilings
on deposits and loan charges.2" Branches have the additional significant ad-
vantage that their loan limit is a function of the capital position of the parent
bank, while that of a subsidiary is a function of its own capital.2"
D. Agencies
Although agencies are prohibited from receiving deposits subject to with-
drawal, their activities are even more varied and complex than those of foreign
'Zwick, supra note 2, at 5.
"For example, foreign branches cannot receive FDIC insurance, and therefore are prevented
from accepting deposits under California law. But since subsidiaries are eligible for FDIC
insurance, foreign banks wishing to conduct retail activities in California have favored the use of
this banking form. However, under a 1969 California statute, branches may accept deposits from
overseas sources if authorized to do so by the State Department of Banking. Several branches have
received such authorization. Klopstock, supra, note 7, at 141.
21974 Hearings, supra note 3.
"Johnson, supra note 1, at 607.
"Zwick, supra note 1, at 607.
"Id., at 7.
24Id.
"lKlopstock, supra note 7, at 141.
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branches. Most agencies are active in financing trade between the United States
and the home country, and are able to issue letters of credit, to buy, sell, pay
and collect bills of exchange in connection with United States-foreign trade, and
to handle the dollar balances and administer the dollar needs of their head
office and its branches. 6 Agencies account for more than half of the assets of
all foreign banking offices in the United States.2" Because they can neither
accept local deposits nor sell certificates of deposits, they rely heavily on inter-
bank (federal funds) borrowing and borrowing from directly related institutions
abroad (Eurodollars). These sources account for a total of 75 percent of their
funds, which are employed in money market loans and commercial and in-
dustrial loans often related to international transactions.2" In New York State
an election must be made between a branch and an agency, since foreign banks
are not permitted. to operate both instrumentalities. However, although estab-
lishment of a branch precludes operating an agency, a foreign bank is permitted
to operate both an agency and a subsidiary; and a number of foreign banks
have apparently concluded that the freedom from restrictions which agencies
enjoy, coupled with the authority to receive deposits in affiliated subsidiaries,
is preferable to operating through branches.29 Canadian and Japanese banks
both appear to favor the use of agencies in New York.
IM. United States Regulatory Scheme
In general, federal law neither provides for nor prohibits foreign banking
operations in the United States, and the entry of foreign banks is governed
almost exclusively by state laws and regulations.3 0 With every state adopting
its own regulations, highly permissive and highly restrictive climates for foreign
banking may exist in neighboring states. Each of the ten states which presently
permits some form of foreign banking has its own distinct set of requirements
which must be satisfied. This has been confusing to many banks desiring to
establish facilities in the United States; they see the American regulatory pat-
tern as less than ideal and cannot understand why the federal government
leaves to the states the politically and economically important areas of foreign
bank entry, expansion and supervision.31 Moreover, the present pattern has
significant implications for the reciprocal rights of American banks attempting
to expand overseas. Many foreign countries demand reciprocal treatment for
their banking institutions before they will allow a foreign branch within their
mZwick, supra note 2, at 7.




'wick, supra note 2, at 7.3 Klopstock, supra note 7, at 154.
31Lehr, supra note 5, at 956.
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borders. This means that American banks in states with liberal banking laws
have greater opportunities abroad than banks from states which do not permit
foreign branch banking.
A. State Regulation
At least ten states presently authorize foreign banks to conduct business
within their borders: Alaska,32 California,33 Georgia,3 4 Hawaii,3" Illinois,36
Massachusetts,37 Missouri,3" New York,39 Oregon, 40 and Washington. 4' Ten
states specifically prohibit foreign banks from operating within their borders:
Florida, 42 Maine, 43 Maryland, 44 Minnesota,4 5 New Jersey, 46 Ohio, 47 Rhode
Island, 48 Texas, 49 Virginia,"0 and West Virginia." With the exception of New
Jersey, the statutes appear to be directed at banks chartered in other states,
and not against banks from foreign countries. The remaining states have no
laws which specifically deal with foreign banks. Where a state does not expressly
permit the entry of foreign banks and the state law is otherwise silent, it may be
assumed that no foreign branch banking will be permitted, although certain
other limited forms of banking may be allowed.
Although state enabling statutes vary greatly with respect to comprehensive-
ness, they are generally specific with respect to the type of office permitted,
the necessity for insurance, license periods, required reserves, and asset and
capital requirements.
In reviewing state laws regarding foreign banks, certain patterns are discern-
ible. The two most important centers of banking activity, California and New
York, have been extremely liberal in allowing foreign banks to operate through
various flexible banking forms, and to function within the state in much the
"See generally, ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.367; § 06.05.360; 06.10.010-06.10.050 (1960).
"See generally, CAL. FIN. CODE § 1750-1952 (West 1968).
34See generally, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-2401-13-2412 (1%7).
"See generally, -AwAII REV. STAT. § 403-5; §403-16 (1%8).
36See generally ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 16-1/2, § 501-19 (1972).
"See generally, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 167-§§37-45A (1971).
"See generally Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 362.423-362.460 (Vernon 1968).
"See generally, N.Y. BANKING LAW § 200-209 (McKinney 1971).4 See generally, ORE, REV. STAT. § 706.070; §§ 708.005-708.060; §§ 713.010-713.110 (1953).
"'See generally, Wash. Legislative Service, supplementing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 53, §§
1-38 (1973).
'
2 FLA. STAT. § 659.57 (1%6).
43ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 94 (1964).
"MD. ANN. CODE art. 11, § 31A (1957).
"SMINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.04 (1969).
"N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-316A (1%3).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1101.05 (page 1%8).
"R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-5-10 (1%8).49TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 16.
"VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-5 (1966).
'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31A-2-5 (1972).
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same way as domestic banks. In both states, however, officials from the smaller
banks have argued with increasing force for tighter regulation of foreign banks
and more restrictions on the activities in which foreign banks are permitted
to engage. The large international banks have been successful, thus far, in
preventing the adoption of such restrictions by stressing the likelihood of
retaliatory action abroad. However, in the last year or two there have been
indications of a growing protectionist spirit which may curb the largely unfet-
tered expansion of foreign banks in California and New York. Two bills intro-
duced in the California legislature in the summer of 1973 would have condi-
tioned further foreign bank expansion on reciprocal treatment of California
banks abroad. Although these measures were defeated, they attracted
considerable support in the state legislature."2 In New York, the state banking
authority refused to permit the acquisition by Barclay's New York subsidiary
of the Long Island Trust Company, with $508 million in assets, because it would
have given the British bank too large a deposit base in the New York City area. 3
These two incidents suggest that both New York and California may have begun
to move gradually away from their historically permissive banking climates.
Many other other states appear willing to permit foreign banks to operate
within their borders so long as such banks do not compete with the state's retail
banks. This may be accomplished by preventing foreign banks from accepting
deposits, 4 or more indirectly by restricting foreign banks to activities related to
international trade,5 5 or by limiting foreign banks to a single office.5 6
It is generally recognized that foreign banking can add new resources and
capabilities to the banking and financial community, particularly in areas
related to international trade and foreign investment within the state. With
this in mind, state legislatures appear to be trying to create regulatory schemes
which encourage foreign banks to operate in those areas which complement
but do not compete directly with the existing activities of domestic banks.
B. Federal Regulation
Although the entry and regulation of foreign bank branches and agencies
are matters of state discretion, the federal Rovernment does have some limited
"Allen, supra Note 16.
"Porter, UK Clearing Banks Follow Diverse Course in U.S., J. COMMERCE, December 10, 1973,
§ 2, at 8, col. 1.
"Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Missouri and Oregon are among the states which permit foreign
banking but prohibit the acceptance of deposits by foreign banks.
"Under a new statute Washington permits foreign banks to conduct certain limited banking
activities where reciprocal banking privileges are extended to Washington banks by the foreign
country under whose laws the foreign bank is chartered. The new statute appears to limit foreign
banking activitity to business related to international trade. See generally, Wash. Legislative
Service, supplementing WASH. Rxv. CODE ANN. ch. 53, §§ 1-38 (1973).
"Under a recent comprehensive Illinois statute, foreign banks are permitted to establish a branch
office in Illinois empowered to conduct a general banking business, but only with the central
business district of Chicago. See generally, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16-1/2 §§ 501-19 (1972).
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jurisdiction over the subsidiaries of foreign banks. Subsidiaries may elect to
be chartered under state or federal law; if a subsidiary opts for a national
charter it automatically receives FDIC insurance and therefore becomes a
member of the Federal Reserve system, subject to regulation by the Comptroller
of the Currency." Foreign banks wishing to conduct retail business in Califor-
nia have favored the use of federally chartered subsidiaries, as have foreign
banks performing trust functions in New York, and in this way they have be-
come subject to limited federal supervision.
Another way in which federal agencies have achieved a means of control over
foreign banks is through the Bank Holding Company Act, which requires all
bank holding companies, whether domestic or foreign, to register if they own
or control one or more domestically chartered banks. 58 Under the 1970 Amend-
ments59 to the Bank Holding Company Act, holding companies, including
foreign holding companies, are prohibited from operating banking subsid-
iaries in more than one state unless these operations were in existence prior to
1956. Five foreign-owned banks with multi-state operations qualify under this
grandfather clause, 60 but others are able to circumvent the interstate branching
restrictions by a complex mechanism which permits foreign bank holding
companies to operate through an inter-state network of affiliates. This cannot
be duplicated by domestic banks, 6' and so it appears that, in the single area
where foreign banks have been subject to direct federal regulation, this regula-
tion has enabled them to seize advantages not available to domestic banks.
It should be pointed out that despite the inability of federal agencies to
regulate foreign banking directly, the foreign banks have complied voluntarily
whenever their cooperation was requested. For example, in June, 1973, the
Federal Reserve Board introduced marginal reserve requirements for large
certificates of deposit issued by member banks. When the Board asked foreign-
owned banks to also maintain reserve deposits against increases in large certif-
icates of deposit, they complied. 62 This is characteristic of the way in which the
Federal Reserve System is able to regulate foreign banking activities by "moral
suasion"; foreign banks have thus far been willing to cooperate in order to
forestall any more formal efforts at federal supervision.
"12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1970).
112 U.S.C. 1844a (1970).
1112 U.S.C. 1841 (1970).
"Bank of Montreal, Barclays Bank, Bank of Tokyo, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, and
the Toronto Dominion Bank.
6'See FED. RESERVE BULL., August, 1968 at 682. See also, The Economist, January 27, 1973 at
67.621974 Hearings, supra note 3.
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IV. Problems Associated With Foreign Bank Expansion
The rapid expansion of foreign banks in the United States and their emer-
gence as a competitive force here has focused attention on a number of prob-
lems in the regulatory framework within which foreign banks must operate.
It is clear that foreign banks do enjoy certain advantages over domestic banks
because of the way in which they are regulated. However, they also operate
under certain restrictions which do not apply to United States banks. These
competitive inequalities, which have increased in significance as the scope of
foreign banking has expanded, have been sharply criticized by many United
States bankers. In addition to these regulatory inequities, the expansion of
foreign banking also has some significant foreign and monetary policy implica-
tions. Gradually there has been a recognition that the regulation of foreign
banks should be modified to minimize present competitive inequalities and
to insure that the regulatory scheme properly reflects broad national policies
and goals. Regulatory reform was attempted in 1966, 1967 and 1969 without
success, but a new set of legislative measures is now under active consideration.
Before discussing them it is first necessary to understand the types of problems
and issues to which these proposals for legislative reform are addressed.
A. Competitive Inequalities
George Mitchell, Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Board of
Governors, recently reaffirmed the principle that foreign companies operating
in the United States should be subject to the same rules and regulations govern-
ing domestically-owned companies. He stated that with respect to both entry
and activities, comparable foreign and domestic banks should be given equiv-
alent treatment.6 3 The Comptroller of the Currency, James E. Smith, also
spoke out last year on the need for a non-discriminatory national banking policy
which would treat foreign and domestic banks alike, and which would eliminate
the present branch advantages enjoyed by overseas banking institutions.6 4
The ability to establish branches in more than one state is in fact the most
significant advantage which foreign banks have over domestic banks. United
States banks may not branch outside their own state and domestic holding
companies may not acquire a bank outside the state of its principal bank. Al-
though United States banks may operate across state lines in a very limited
sense through the use of representative offices or Edge Act subsidiaries, they
are clearly unable to match the geographic flexibility of foreign banks.
"
3Mitchell, Draft Outline: Legislation on Regulation of Foreign Bank Activities, (circulated
informally together with cover letter dated February 7, 1974).
"AMER. BAnR, February 8, 1974 at 1, col. 3.
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Foreign banks are also in an advantageous position because they are not
subject to the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act. 6 As a result,
foreign branch banks may engage in a wide range of non-banking activities
which are prohibited to United States banks. Most importantly, foreign banks
are entering the securities markets and finding ways to combine brokerage or
investment business with commercial banking-either directly, by having a
branch operate a brokerage or investment banking department, or indirectly,
by a foreign parent which creates both a domestic branch and a brokerage or
investment banking subsidiary. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, these
approaches are prohibited to domestic banks since they violate the spirit of
the Glass Steagall Act, not applicable to foreign banks. 66
United States banks are prohibited from investing in securities affiliates
both by the Glass Steagall Act, which applies to all Federal Reserve System
member banks, and by Regulation Y of the Bank Holding Company Act which
generally excludes bank holding companies from the non-banking activities
of investment banking and also precludes significant investment in brokerage
firms or companies engaged in securities underwriting.' 7 Thus, whereas United
States banks are unable to offer brokerage or underwriting services, foreign
banks have an increasing number of United States affiliates actively engaged in
the securities business, in some cases as underwriters for new issues. Several
affiliates of foreign banks have also become members of regional stock ex-
changes in the United States. Although the brokerage and underwriting activ-
ities of foreign banks are not yet significant in terms of business volume, they do
represent another competitive advantage of growing importance to foreign
banks.
Yet another advantage enjoyed by foreign banks stems from the fact that
they are exempt from certain federal regulations governing insurance, interest
rates and reserves. Depending on the state, foreign banks may operate under
lower reserve requirements than United States banks, which lowers the cost
of lendable funds. Also, it appears that in some states foreign banks may invest
their reserves in interest-bearing securities, a privilege denied to members of
the Federal Reserve System.
In addition to these foreign bank advantages, there are several statutory dis-
advantages which should be noted. As mentioned, disparate state regulatory
schemes require foreign banks to comply with a complex set of overlapping
and often conflicting regulations. Further, the inability to secure FDIC coverage
"Harfield, Legal Considerations in International Banking, 91 BANK. L.J. 624, 636 (1974).
"1974 Hearings, supra, note 4.
"See generally, Guenther, The 1970 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments and State
Influence on Banking Structure, 89 BANK. I.J. 318 (1972); Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities
Activities, 91 BANK. L.J. 611 (1974).
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may discourage depositors from banking at foreign branches since the risk of
failure is not fully covered. Also, because they are not members of the Federal
Reserve System, foreign banks do not have access to the discount window, and
their long-term deposits are subject to the interest equalization tax .68
It is clear that the present regulatory framework which treats foreign and
domestic banks differently results in some significant advantages accruing to
foreign banks, as well as some less important disadvantages. This competitive
inequality argues strongly for regulatory reform which would provide similar
treatment to foreign and domestic banks, consistent with. a policy of non-
discrimination. Moreover, the regulation of foreign banks by our dual banking
system has led to certain other more general problems which also call for
structural reform.
B. Impact of Foreign Banks on Monetary Policy
The rapid expansion of foreign banking activity in the United States has
the potential for frustrating domestic as well as international monetary policies.
Because of the absence of any direct control over foreign bank reserves, foreign
bank offices in the United States can shift funds in and out of the country using
overseas sources which are unresponsive to United States policies. Vice Chair-
man Mitchell of the Federal Reserve Board recently stated that: "There has
been greater movement of funds internationally, creating some problems in
implementing U.S. monetary policy. '6'
In at least one respect, foreign banks have had a positive impact on that
policy. Foreign banking activity has exerted a favorable influence on the United
States balance of payments in several ways. First, the initial capital invested
by foreign banks to establish offices, coupled with subsequent advances to
American affiliates, represents a net inflow of capital. Secondly, deposits made
by foreigners in United States offices of foreign banks have generally exceeded
the volume of foreign loans made by these institutions, and to this extent our
payments deficit has been reduced. Also, the American payments position has
been improved by the ability of United States offices of foreign banks to induce
foreign dollar holders to convert liquid dollar holdings into non-liquid invest-
ments. Lastly, those foreign banks which have played a major role in trade
financing have contributed to improving our trade balances. 7 0 Although it is
difficult to quantify the net effect of foreign banking on this nation's balance
of payments because of a lack of published data, there appears to be a
consensus among authorities that the expansion of foreign banks has had a
positive, if uncontrolled, impact.
"1974 Hearings, supra note 3.
6 Id.
7 Zwick, supra note 2, at 18-21.
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C. Reciprocity
As has already been mentioned, some United States banks have encountered
difficulty in expanding overseas because of state laws relating to foreign bank
entry. California banks, for example, have been handicapped by their state's
attitude toward foreign branch banking, as were a number of Illinois banks
prior to the recent statutory changes. 7' The present United States system of
regulating foreign banks, critics argue, discriminates against banks from
certain states and also raises the possibility of retaliatory restrictions by foreign
countries.
Also, it may reasonably be asked whether it is appropriate for state legis-
latures to retain discretion over an issue of such national concern. Moreover,
state regulation of foreign banking may represent an unconstitutional intrusion
by the states into the field of foreign relations. But before examining the
Constitutional issue, it is worth considering how foreign governments have
dealt with the question of foreign bank entry and reciprocity.
Most countries lack specific legislation governing the entry of foreign banks;
restrictions on entry are generally imposed by discretionary policy of the govern-
ment or the particular agencies charged with bank regulation and supervision."
Where legislation does exist, as in Sweden, Mexico, Australia and Canada, it
usually prohibits the establishment of foreign banking corporations, either
by making ownership of facilities illegal (as in Sweden and Mexico), or by
sharply limiting the domestic activities of foreign banks (as in Australia).73
In the absence of such legislation, foreign authorities have generally permit-
ted United States banks to operate abroad in much the same manner as indig-
enous banks. Reserve requirements, loan restrictions, interest and capital
ceilings and branching restrictions are in most cases the same for both foreign
and domestic banks. The one area where the activities of foreign banks are oc-
casionally circumscribed is the acceptance of deposits. A few countries confine
overseas banking to agency operations and permit no acceptance of deposits
at all, but the more characteristic restriction simply precludes the acceptance
of savings deposits.
Brazil and Japan are among the few foreign countries which require a dem-
onstration of reciprocity on the part of the applicant's home country. Domicile
in a state which permits foreign banking has been held to satisfy the foreign
reciprocity demand for American banking applicants, but a number of issues
are yet unresolved. It is unclear, for example, whether and to what extent re-
"Lehr, supra note 5, at 956.
"Joint Economic Committee, Paper No. 10, Foreign Government Restraints on United States
Bank Operations Abroad, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1967).
73Id.
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strictions placed upon operating practices but not on entry weaken an assertion
that reciprocal treatment is being afforded. Also, where the national govern-
ment is prepared to accept a foreign bank but local government agencies limit
the ability of the bank to conduct operations, it is unclear whether reciprocal
treatment is being extended. Identical treatment may not be necessary for
reciprocity to exist, but there is considerable uncertainty as to the degree of
dissimilarity which may occur.
Even though foreign restraints on foreign banking per se are uncommon,
a number of countries indirectly control the form of foreign banking organiza-
tions which may be permitted within their borders. For example, Brazil and
Japan have virtually precluded the use of branches by American banks, al-
though in most other countries including France, Germany, the United King-
dom, Belgium and the Netherlands, branches are no more difficult to operate
than any other banking form.74 In some countries which do not discriminate
against particular banking forms, there are nevertheless limits placed on the
total number of banking licenses which can be issued. Foreign banks seeking
entry may therefore have to purchase an existing bank where this is permitted,
or possibly a dormant banking license with the prospect of converting it to a
direct branch. Finally, a few countries attempt to restrict foreign banks to
activities more or less directly related to international trade and the servicing
of multinational corporations."
Japan has been one of the most conservative foreign countries in permitting
foreign banks to enter. Only about ten foreign banks a year have been allowed
to open branches76 apparently because of a fear of domestic overbanking and
lingering concern over the large-scale banking collapse of the 1930's." Japan
has further limited the expansion of foreign banking within Japan by stipulating
that the deposits of all the branches of foreign banks within Japan cannot
exceed 1 percent of deposits held by domestic banks.
Despite the fact that foreign countries have occasionally discouraged foreign
banks from using certain organizational forms, limited the number of entering
banks, or restricted their activities to foreign trade financing, in general the
pattern has been to subject the activities of foreign banks to the same banking
regulations which are applied to indigenous banks. In considering modifica-
tions to the American regulatory scheme which would increase the differentia-
tion between foreign and domestic banks by further circumscribing the
"Id., at 25.
"Mitchell, Fed Mulls Possible Regulatory Changes, BANKERS MONTHLY, June 15, 1973, at 25.
"Kuroda, The Changing Structure of International Banking, EUROMONEY, March, 1974, at 25.
"Id. The number of foreign banks with branches or representative offices in Japan has increased
from 13 in 1960, to 18 in 1970, and 41 by the end of 1973. The number of representative offices was
67 by 1974 and this number appears to be increasing by roughly two per month.
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activities of foreign banks or subjecting them to additional requirements or
distinct standards, it should be kept in mind that such proposals might cause
foreign countries to review their essentially nondiscriminatory policies and
adopt a more restrictive posture with respect to American banking activities.
D. Constitutionality of State Statutes
A broader question concerns the desirability of vesting in the states collective
discretion for determining our national policy with respect to foreign banking.
The ability of states to adopt widely varying, independent policies with regard
to the entry and regulation of foreign financial institutions inhibits the orderly
formulation of coherent national policies. This general argument for increasing
the degree of federal control over foreign banks is strengthened by some strong
constitutional arguments which suggest that foreign banking is not an ap-
propriate subject of state control, but rather should be within the exclusive
province of the federal government.
These constitutional arguments are grounded primarily in the Commerce
Clause, which expressly confers on Congress the "power to regulate commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, ' 78 and also in an implied
constitutional limitation barring state impingement on the federal domain of
foreign relations.
1. IMPACT ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
The affirmative delegation of power to the federal government under the
Commerce Clause of the First Amendment is reinforced by prohibition to the
states. The extent to which the Commerce Clause prohibits state action, how-
ever, is not clear. 79 An early standard was laid down in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens10 which attempted to distinguish between areas where state regulation
would be tolerated and areas where state action is excluded. The court stated,
"whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit of only
one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a
nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress." '81 This test has been
difficult to apply, however, because few subjects are so inherently national or
so wholly local in character as to provide an effective basis for distinction.
Two subsequent tests have attempted to provide more workable standards,
although the relationship between the two remains somewhat unclear. In
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan82 the court stated that, "Rec-
onciliation of the conflicting claims of state and national power is to be at-
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
"HENKIN, FoREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTIoN, 235 (1972).
8053 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
"53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
11325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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tained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands
of the state and national interests involved. 83 This formula has, like the Cooley
standard, proved easier to mandate than to apply; and in some cases courts
have relied on a second, distinct test: whether the state burden on commerce
is "unreasonable" or "undue," irrespective of its impact on local interests."'
Under both tests, the courts have refused to sustain state regulations which
exclude or overly discriminate against foreign commerce. State legislation
grounded in non-economic, local interests has been more favorably received,
but even here regulations have been struck down if less burdensome means of
achieving their objectives are found to exist."5 It would seem, then, that state
statutes regulating foreign banking are at least arguably unconstitutional.
Under Southern Pacific, such regulation will only be upheld "provided it does
not materially restrict the free flow of commerce across state lines, or interfere
with . . . matters with respect to which uniformity of regulation is of predom-
inant national concern."" Restrictive state regulation of foreign banking
both materially restricts interstate commercial flows and effectively precludes
the development of a coherent national policy in an area in which there is
increasing need for a single set of uniform regulations. The same conclusion
is reached by evaluating the extent of the burden placed on interstate commerce
by restrictive state statutes. Moreover, regardless of the magnitude of the
burden on commerce, it has been repeatedly held that states may not pass
laws where the objective of such legislation is to insulate state enterprises from
the effects of out-of-state competition. The argument that the limitation of
competition would contribute to safety and conservation and therefore
indirectly serve an end permissible to the state was rejected in Buck v. Kuy-
kendall 7 and in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond. 88 States may not protect their
domestic banking industry by excluding foreign banks completely or dis-
criminating against them in certain ways; thus, existing state statutes, by bar-
ring or restricting foreign banking, attempt to promote local economic ad-
vantages by interfering with the free flow of interstate commerce in a way
which may be found to violate the Commerce Clause.89
2. FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The conclusion that foreign banking is more appropriately regulated by
the federal government finds support particularly where state regulation
11325 U.S. at 768.
'HENKEN, supra note 79, at 236.
OsId.
"1325 U.S. at 770.
"267 U.S. 307 (1925).
"8336 U.S. 525 (1949).
"HENKEN, supra note 79, at 236.
International Lawyer, Vol. 9, No. 4
676 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
impinges on the foreign policy and foreign relations of the United States.
Although the Constitution does not expressly delegate the power to conduct
foreign relations to the federal government, a new constitutional doctrine has
emerged under Zschernig v. Miller" which invests the President and the
Congress with primacy in the field of foreign relations. Until 1968 no such
principle had been recognized, and although some state statutes were struck
down for violating the 14th amendment, or because they were inconsistent with
federal policy as expressed in a treaty, statute, executive act or judicial decision,
it had not been suggested that such statutes might violate an implied constitu-
tional prohibition barring state impingement on the federal domain of foreign
relations, even in the absence of federal legislation. 91 In fact, the court expressly
rejected such a theory in Clark v. Allen,92 where it upheld a California statute
allowing an alien to inherit in the state only if his country permitted Americans
to inherit. The court stated that "what California has done will have some
incidental or indirect effect on foreign countries. But that is true of many state
laws . . ."" Under Clark, some affirmative federal action was requiredbefore
the court could determine whether a state had eclipsed the permissible sphere of
activity involving foreign affairs.9,
Zschernig v. Miller, decided on facts similar to those in Clark, has signif-
icantly reduced the relevance of Clark without expressly overruling it.
Zschernig involved an Oregon state statute under which the Oregon courts had
denied an inheritance to an East German resident because he could not satisfy
the courts that his country allowed Americans to inherit estates in East
Germany. Notwithstanding a brief amicus curiae filed by the State Department
which stated that the federal government was not contending that the Oregon
escheat statute unduly interfered with the United States' conduct of foreign
policy, the court held that the statutory demand for reciprocity was "an
intrusion by the states into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution
entrusts to the President and Congress."" The court acknowledged the direct
effect of reciprocity and retention statutes upon foreign relations and held that
an Oregon probate statute, as applied, represented an invalid invasion by the
state into an area reserved for the federal government.9" Speaking for the
majority, Justice Douglas stated that the present Oregon Law, "Has a direct
impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the
central government to deal with those problems." 97 By failing to overrule Clark,
90389 U.S. 429 (1968).
"HENKEN, supra note 79, at 238.
"1331 U.S. 503 (1947).
"1331 U.S. at 517.
"Johnson, supra note 1, at 616.
9389 U.S. at 432.
"Note, Reciprocity and Retention Statutes-A New Direction, 22 RuTGERS L.R. 770 (1968).
9389 U.S. at 440-441.
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however, the court in Zschernig implicitly adopted the three tests articulated in
Clark without indicating their relative importance. The tests are: (1) whether
the state action displays an "improper purpose" to influence foreign affairs;
(2) whether the state action actually interferes with federal foreign policy; and
(3) whether U.S. foreign relations have been affected adversely.
Under Zschernig and the cases construing it, so long as state courts do no
more than routinely read foreign laws in applying reciprocity statutes, their
decisions will be constitutional. 98 Where the courts go further and construe
statutes in such a way as to create an impact on foreign relations, their decisions
will be struck down as unconstitutional. That is, Zschernig proscribes only
statutes requiring some criticism of foreign governments by state courts or
legislatures. So a state statute which permits foreign banking on a showing of
reciprocal banking privileges granted American banks without requiring the
state judge or legislature to qualitatively assess the foreign government, might
be upheld.99 But state statutes regulating foreign bank entry do not operate
in such a passive way. Rather, a. principal statutory objective is to induce foreign
governments to grant reciprocal rights to United States banks, and possibly
also to provide a mechanism for excluding the banks of those nations with
whom the U.S. does not enjoy friendly relations. Thus, state statutes regulating
the entry and activities of overseas banks could certainly have the effect of
increasing tensions between the United States and other nations and so be held
unconstitutional under Zschernig. An example may help illustrate how a con-
flicting pattern of state regulation in the area of foreign banking would adverse-
ly affect the conduct of foreign policy. The development of economic relations
with the Soviet Union is an important secondary aspect of detente; the Soviet
desire for foreign trade, technology and investment from abroad is at least
partly responsible for that country's interest in reducing international tensions.
Presumably the United States will support a gradual and controlled develop-
ment of economic relations with the Soviet Union. Such developments might
very well call for the extension of reciprocal banking privileges, with the timing
and nature of the privileges to be determined in accordance with larger eco-
nomic and foreign policy objectives. Such a program assumes the ability of
"Note, Conflict of Laws-Constitutionality of State Statutes Governing Ability of Nonresident
Aliens to Receive Property Under American Wills: Zschernig v. Miller, 21 V"D. L.R. 502, 513
(1968).
"Some commentators, however, have argued that all reciprocity statutes are suspect, including
those which involve no judgment or qualitative assessment of other foreign governments. It is
argued that reciprocity statutes are infected with foreign policy judgments and in view of the delicate
considerations involved, the danger that foreign governments would take offense, and the disruptive
effect of different state statutes, reciprocity statutes represent unconstitutional incursions into the
prerogatives of the Executive and Congress. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 H-ARV. L. REV. 238
(1968).
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the President and Congress to confer and coordinate banking privileges on
the basis of national policy considerations. Viewed in this light it becomes
apparent that the national interest would conflict with state discretion over
the regulation of foreign banking.
The conclusion which might be inferred from Zschernig that state regulation
of foreign banking is an intrusion into an area reserved for the federal govern-
ment is supported by two approaches formulated by the Supreme Court prior
to Zschernig-and which presumably survive, at least to the extent that Clark
survives.
Under the first approach, the states were prohibited from exercising any
law-making power that interfered with an established policy being actively
carried out by the United States. And under the second approach, the state
could not act so as to have a possibly adverse effect on United States foreign
relations. 1"0
Under the first approach, the Supreme Court has invalidated state and
municipal statutes affecting interstate commerce where the court considered
them inconsistent with federal policy or federal objective. 10 If a national policy
in the field of interstate commerce may be thwarted by state and local
interference, the court has found that such regulation would have to give way;
however, state laws are only to be invalidated if their enforcement would
significantly hinder an obvious congressional policy.102 By this standard, state
regulations restricting foreign bank activities or excluding foreign banks
altogether would at least arguably be held unconstitutional insofar as such laws
or regulations would frustrate the improvement of foreign trade and direct
foreign investment, impede the favorable balance of payments effect associated
with the expansion of foreign banks in the United States, and interfere with the
application of federal monetary controls.
Under the second approach, a state statute restricting the entry of foreign
banks would be unconstitutional to the extent that such a law has a potentially
adverse effect on foreign relations. Admittedly, such a statute would not
irreparably cripple United States foreign policy; but the likelihood of increasing
tensions or triggering retaliatory measures is significant. Moreover, it is the
federal government with whom complaints will be registered by aggrieved
foreign governments, and unless the states are preempted, the federal
government will be unable to respond to such complaints. Thus, under both
these pre-Zschernig approaches the constitutionality of state regulation of
foreign banks is called into question.
1'0 Johnson, supra note 1, at 618.
"'See, e.g. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
1022 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.23, at 46 (1969).
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A third, more recent methodology reinforces the conclusion that foreign
banking should be regulated exclusively by the federal government. This
analytical approach assumes that, the "principal determination on which cases
should turn is whether the matter is best decided by a national rather than a
state decision maker."' 13 Three factors are considered under this approach:
whether the state's constituency provides an appropriate political context in
which to make the policy judgment; whether the state has the necessary
information to reach an informed judgment; and whether potentially adverse
effects will be suffered by the state or the nation. Applying each of these criteria,
it appears evident that foreign banking in the United States is most
appropriately regulated at the federal level.
3. CONTRAVENTION OF UNITED STATES TREATIES
A separate and distinct constitutional issue is whether state statutes which
regulate foreign banking contravene certain United States treaty provisions.
The national treatment clause of a post World War II Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation Treaty with the Netherlands provides that:
1. Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment with
respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other
activity ... within the territories of the other Party ... Accordingly, such nationals
and companies shall be permitted within such territories ... to establish and
maintain branches, agencies ... and other establishments ....
2. Each Party reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens may within its
territories establish ... or carry on enterprises engaged in ... banking involving
depository or fiduciary functions .... o10
Under this treaty it would appear that Dutch banks not accepting deposits or
carrying out fiduciary functions must be accorded national treatment; to the
extent that state statutes grant such banks less than national treatment they will
be struck down since treaties will supersede inconsistent state law. ls
Although the National Treatment clauses of other FCN treaties differ, the
provisions cited are sufficiently characteristic as to call into question the validity
of restrictive state legislation under which foreign and comparable domestic
banks are accorded dissimilar treatment.
"'
3See Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in Private International Matters, 5
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133, 166 (1971).
'
0 4Treaty with the Netherlands on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, March 27, 1956, art.
VII, paras. 1 & 2, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942 (effective Dec. 5, 1957).
'OHENKEN, supra note 79, at 166. See, e.g. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924), which held
that treaty provisions "Cannot be rendered nugatory in any part of the United States by municipal
ordinances or state laws." 265 U.S. at 341.
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V. Proposals for Regulatory Reform
The preceding discussion has identified many of the problems and issues
associated with the expansion of foreign banking in the United States, and has
presented a number of arguments for modifying the present regulatory scheme
to increase the power and authority vested in the federal government. At the
present time there are several congressional proposals being actively debated
which would increase the extent of federal supervision over foreign banking. A
significant New York state legislative proposal which was recently considered
would have addressed some of the problems of foreign banking without
conceding state regulatory authority. Finally, the Federal Reserve System has
recently introduced legislation which would substantially alter the regulation of
foreign banking, consolidating principal regulating authority in the Federal
Reserve. Before considering these proposals, several earlier attempts to achieve
legislative reform will be reviewed.
A. Early Reform Efforts
The first thorough. study of foreign banking in the United States was
conducted in 1966 by Dr. Jack Zwick of Columbia University for the Joint
Economic Committee and other Members of the Congress. As a result of the
study and its recommendations, three bills were introduced in the 90th Congress
to bring foreign banks operating in the United States under some greater degree
of federal supervision 10 6 by Congressman Fino of New York, Wright Patman of
the House Banking and Currency Committee and Senator Javits. The bills each
attempted to deal with the principal issues arising under a federal scheme of
regulation, including federal supervision of entry, designation of a federal
agency to exercise principal regulatory authority, handling of deposit insurance,
reciprocal treatment by foreign countries, and the question of whether a
national interest determination should be made prior to allowing a foreign bank
to commence operations in the United States.
All three bills would have permitted foreign banks to enter the United States,
but the bills varied in the scope of activity allowed to such banks. They also took
different approaches with respect to deposit insurance and the standard to be
used in determining which foreign banks were to be chartered.
Although the bills stimulated vigorous debate on the subject of foreign
banking, there was substantial opposition to all three legislative proposals and
none of them ever left Committee. In 1969 Chairman Wright Patman again
introduced legislation which would have placed controls on foreign banking
'
0
'H.R. 570, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1%7); H.R. 6856, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967); S. 1741, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1967).
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activities in the United States. The bill received no Administration support, was
condemned by the major bankers' trade association 10 7 and suffered the same
fate as its predecessor.
In 1972 there was renewed interest in improving the supervision of foreign
banks and the Federal Reserve System established a Steering Committee
consisting of three Board members and three Reserve Bank Presidents to
analyze the foreign activities of United States banks and the United States
activities of foreign-owned banking institutions. The Committee, headed by
Vice Chairman Mitchell, was also charged with responsibility for considering
changes in the regulatory framework and in March, 1974 draft legislation was
circulated informally. In December, 1974 the Federal Reserve Board sent to
Congress the proposed Foreign Bank Act of 1974; when this failed to get
considered before the end of the session, the Federal Reserve Board resubmitted
the legislation with slight modification in March of this year. At the same time
the Federal Reserve proposals were being circulated, informally, two different
bills were introduced in the 93rd Congress. Also, a Commission appointed by
the New York Superintendent of Banking released a report containing concrete
legislative proposals in March of 1974.108 Each of these legislative proposals
represented quite distinct and essentially conflicting approaches to regulatory
reform.
B. Significant Congressional Proposals
Comprehensive foreign bank legislation was submitted in the 93rd Congress
by Representative Patman, 109 Representative Dent110 and Representative Rees
of California.' No action was taken before the Congress adjourned, and the
bills have not been resubmitted in the 94th Congress. Congressmen Rees has,
however, circulated proposed legislation and indicated that he intends to
reintroduce a bill in 1975 after comments on his draft have been received and
analyzed.112 The Rees proposal is generally more restrictive than the Federal
Reserve recommendations and is intended to place foreign bank operations in
the United States under tight federal regulation, imposing on them the same
rules and regulations applicable to domestic banks. The Rees proposal would
restrict retail banking business of foreign banks in certain respects but would
permit foreign banks with branches in more than one state to continue to
'"The American Bankers Association.
1°1NEw YORK STATE BANKING DEPT., REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT'S ADVISORY COMM. ON
FINANCIAL REFORM, at 11-14 (1974). [hereinafter cited as N.Y. REPORT].
'
0 9H.R. 11597, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
"10H.R. 11690, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
"'H.R. 11440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
"'AMER. BANKER, June 6, 1975, at 6.
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operate them if they were established by December 3, 1974, the cutoff date of
the grandfather provision contained in the Federal Reserve bill. However, a
foreign bank intending to retain its branches in more than one state would be
required to convert all branches to federally licensed branches within one year.
Further, foreign banks would be allowed to enter only those states where they
could operate under state law. And, they would be given a certain period to
eliminate or substantially curtail their non-banking activities.
Because his approach to reform would significantly restrict the operating
flexibility presently available to foreign banks, there has been considerable
criticism of the Rees proposal. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has
attacked the Rees proposal, as have spokesmen for state banking authorities.
Mr. Harry Albright, New York Superintendent of Banking, has sharply
criticized the Rees approach because of the deepseated protectionist attitude it
reflects and because it applies "extravagant, disruptive and self-defeating
solutions" to the relatively narrow complaints directed against foreign banks. "I
Concern has been expressed that the Rees approach would invite foreign
nations to retaliate by limiting United States banks geographically. The
Common Market, for example, might limit U.S. banks to a single country
within the Market, forcing them to divest their assets in other countries. United
States overseas banking assets, now worth over $100 million or more than four
times as much as foreign banking assets in this country, would be extremely
vulnerable to such foreign retaliatory action.
The apprehension concerning foreign retaliation expressed by both Mr.
Albright and Chairman Burns is shared by the large United States banks. A
position paper issued March 6, 1974 by the New York Clearing House (to which
12 of the largest New York Banks belong) strongly opposes any legislation
changing the existing system of regulation, on the grounds that such changes
would result in retaliation by foreign regulatory authorities through more
restrictive legislation.1 1 4 Because it is composed of large United States banks
with substantial overseas activities which are vulnerable to foreign retaliation,
the New York Clearing House appears to be the most strongly opposed of all the
professional banking organizations to any form of regulatory change or reform.
Other trade organizations, however, have expressed greater willingness to
support regulatory changes.
In addition to the Rees proposal, there are a number of other bills pending
which would substantially restrict foreign investment in the United States, and
"'Address by Harry W. Albright, Jr., 46th annual midwinter meeting of the New York State
Bankers Association, January 21, 1974.
1"New York Clearing House, Position Paper on Regulation of Foreign Bank Operations in the
United States, March 6, 1974 (unpublished pamphlet).
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would thus incidentally affect foreign banking. Most of these measures reflect
the same protectionist views that characterize the Rees proposal.
C. New York Reciprocity Proposal
To forestall what it regards as the "draconian" measures of the Rees
legislative proposals, the New York State Department of Banking has generated
a set of reform proposals which, in the view of the Department, would correct
many of the competitive -inequalities between foreign and domestic banks
without sacrificing the primacy of state regulatory authority. The most
significant of these proposals was first suggested by Governor Rockefeller in
June 1973 and presented publicly by Mr. Albright, Superintendent of Banking,
in Montreal on September 1, 1973. In order to give domestic and foreign banks
a similar ability to operate branches in several states, Mr. Albright proposed
that bank holding companies be permitted to expand across state lines and
operate full service banks' as long as other states reciprocated."I5
In March, 1974 the Superintendent's Advisory Committee on Financial
Reform formally proposed that "Legislation should be enacted in New York and
the Superintendent should actively seek similar legislation in other states that
would permit reciprocal interstate banking through bank holding company
acquisitions in major cities.""' 6 On March 19, 1974, Governor Wilson
introduced enabling legislation which would allow out-of-state banks to do
business in New York and New York state banks to operate in other states. The
proposed bill" 7 would have allowed out-of-state bank holding companies to
acquire and operate no more than two offices in New York State provided that
the state in which the bank did its chief business permitted similar acquisitions
by New York-based bank holding companies. The proposed bill would have
required the State Superintendent of Banks to approve an out-of-state holding
company's entry into the New York Market, considering the public interest as
well as traditional antitrust criteria.
Response to the New York proposal was particularly enthusiastic in
California, where Donald Pearson, State Superintendent of Banks, expressed
confidence that such legislation would eventually pass. 8 State banking officials
in Massachusetts, Texas and Illinois, however, have indicated that full-scale
interstate banking is not entirely welcome in their states, and banking officials
in yet other states have expressed uncertainty or disinterest."9 Large banks with
"'Allen, supra note 25, col. 3.
"'N.Y. REPORT, supra note 108.
"N.Y. Assembly, Act 10224, February 19, 1974.
"'New York Times, March 22, 1974, at 55.
"'AMER. BA R, March 20, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
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substantial international activities have supported the New York legislative
proposals over the reforms drafted by the Federal Reserve Board. The President
of J.P. Morgan & Co., for example, has spoken out in favor of the New York
state legislation, and the Chairman of the Chemical New York Corp., parent of
the Chemical Bank, also came out in favor of interstate bank branching as
proposed by the New York State Banking Department.12 0
These New York proposals were intended to prevent the expansion of federal
authority over foreign banking by adjustments in state regulation which would
ease restraints on domestic banks rather than increasing restrictions on foreign
banks as the preferred means of equalizing their competitive positions.
Notwithstanding some modest amount of support for the New York proposal,
the measure has not been reintroduced this year.
D. Federal Reserve Proposals
In February, 1974 the Federal Reserve Steering Committee on International
Banking presented a sweeping set of reforms. A draft outline was circulated
containing a set of proposals designed to achieve equality of treatment in the
regulation and supervision of foreign and domestic banks operating in this
country. 121
On December 4, 1974, after comments had been received, the Federal Reserve
Board sent to Congress legislation reflecting most of the features of the draft
proposal."' Because it was introduced so late in the session it failed to get
consideration, and similar legislation was reintroduced on March 5, 1975.123
The proposed legislation would restrict foreign banks to those activities
permitted to domestic banks-with the principal exception that foreign banks
having subsidiaries which dealt in securities would be permitted to retain them
if they had owned them before December 3, 1974, the grandfather date for non-
conforming affiliates. All branches, subsidiaries and agencies of foreign banks
with worldwide assets in excess of $500 million would be required to join the
Federal Reserve System. Approval of the Secretary of the Treasury would be
required for mergers and acquisitions and all foreign banks would be required
to register with and be licensed by the Comptroller of the Currency. The
proposed legislation would also require foreign banks to buy Federal Deposit
Insurance for deposits held in United States branches. Multistate banking
operations being carried on at the time the bill was first introduced would be
12 0 AMER. BANKER, March 21, 1974, at 1, col. 1; J. COMMERCE, March 28, 1974, at 3.
2 Mitchell, supra note 63.




'Foreign Bank Act of 1975, S. 958, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 5617, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975).
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permanently grandfathered and could be expanded where state law permitted.
Federal law which now requires that all directors of national banks be United
States citizens, would be changed to permit up to one-half of the directors to be
non-United States citizens."2 4
It does not presently appear that the Federal Reserve proposals have any
likelihood of being adopted this year since the House Banking, Currency and
Housing Committee disclosed in April that it will undertake a major study of
financial institutions-including foreign banks-with a view to producing
legislative recommendations by 1976; it now appears that regulatory reform will
await the completion of this study. 2
These most recent Federal Reserve legislative proposals may be viewed as part
of a trend, apparent since the 1950s, to add new and significant responsibilities
to federal regulatory agencies in the area of banking. I6 Much of the criticism of
the Federal Reserve proposals has focused on this alleged erosion of the dual
banking system. It has also been argued that implementation of the draft
legislation, particularly the provision limiting foreign banks to one state, could
lead to retaliation by foreign governments. Mr. Juergen Ponton, Chairman of
the Board of Managers of the Dresden Bank, stated at a recent news conference
that West German bankers regarded the measures being contemplated by the
Federal Reserve Board as unfriendly; he further pointed out that reciprocal
restrictions in West Germany would severely hurt major American banks. 27
Other European bankers have reacted more cautiously but have expressed
similar objections to the tightening of regulations governing their American
operations. 28
European bankers have been even more critical of the Patman and Rees
proposals. 129 German officials, for example, have conceded privately that the
Federal Reserve proposals cannot be construed as discriminatory, but that the
provisions of other bills now under consideration are a source of much greater
concern. 130
Although the Federal Reserve proposals attempt to make foreign bank
operations subject to the same regulations which apply to domestic banks, such
changes are viewed from a foreign perspective as discriminatory in that they
"'For a summary of the provisions and discussion of the December and March versions of the
Federal Reserve legislative proposals, see AMER. BANKER, December 4, 1974, at 1; AMER. BANEn,
March 1, 1975, at 1; FED. RESERVE BULL., December 1974 at 881. For a survey of reactions to the
Federal Reserve proposals see AMER. BANtER, December 5, 1975 at 1.
'AMER. BAnE, April 25, 1975, at 1.
...See generally, Leavitt, The Philosophy of Financial Regulation, 90 BAtIK. L.J. 632 (1973);
Shay, The Emerging Federal Reserve Primacy in Bank Supervision, 90 BANK L.J. 649, 650 (1973).
'"J. COMMERCE, March 29, 1974, at 1.
"'AMER. BANKER, March 21, 1974, at 1.
129Id.
"'J. COMEMRCE, March 29, 1974, at 1; BusiNEss WEEK, July 13, 1974 at 61.
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would operate to restrict the present activities of foreign banks. Both United
States and foreign banking officials have claimed that the proposed regulations
would violate the principle of reciprocity, 131 but this has proved to be an illusive
and unsatisfactory concept on which to focus. Because the regulation of
banking varies so greatly between the United States and foreign countries, it is
not possible to define reciprocity between them. For example, American banks
may presently branch throughout Germany, France and the United Kingdom;
whereas branches of banks of these countries are restricted in the United States
to a relatively few states. Foreign governments could certainly argue that the
United States is therefore lacking in reciprocity by not permitting branching in
any state. Or, it could be argued, reciprocity is lacking unless an equal number
of banks from each country is permitted to establish banks in the other country.
As is apparent, the concept of reciprocity is an elusive standard against which to
evaluate regulatory changes.' 3 2 Rather, the principle of non-discrimination
appears fundamentally more appropriate and workable. This is clear in
considering the Federal Reserve proposals with respect to monetary policy and
the United States balance of payments. Foreign banks or their governments
would not object to having their branches subject to the same reserve require-
ments, interest rate ceilings, lending restrictions and similar tools of monetary
policy which are applied to American banks. The lack of significant or
sustained foreign opposition to these proposed reforms can be explained
through the generally accepted rule abroad that foreign banks are subject to
and must comply with the same central bank rules to which local banks have to
respond. This represents an easily definable system of equality or non-discrim-
ination which both United States and foreign banks, as well as regulatory
agencies will accept as essentially equitable.
X. Conclusion
Until the emergence of foreign banks as a major competitive force in the
United States, it was understandable that their regulation should have been left
to the states. The volume of foreign banking activity was, until recently, so small
that any disparities in the opportunities available to foreign and domestic banks
were not sufficiently important to call into question the historic and traditional
state regulatory authority over banking operations.
In the last few years, however, this has changed. The growing volume of
'In an interview, the Illinois Commissioner of Banks, H. Robert Bartell said that the various
aspects of foreign bank regulation and reciprocity are closely linked and actions in one area may
have unexpected results in another area. AMER. BA KEn, March 14, 1974, at 1.
I "See generally, Von Klemperer, Foreign Banking Regulation Stirs Questions, AMER. BANKER,
February 28, 1974, at IA; Edwards, Regulation of Foreign Banking in the United States: Inter-
national Reciprocity and Federal State Conflicts, 13 COL. J. TRANs. L. 239 (1974).
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banking being conducted by foreign banks has increased the significance of
competitive inequalities, and has precipitated a number of proposals to place
foreign and domestic banks on a more competitively even footing. The Rees
proposal would remove those regulatory advantages which foreign banks
presently enjoy and replace them with additional restrictions not applied to
domestic banks. This protectionist approach violates a policy of
non-discrimination fundamental in our approach to the regulation of foreign
direct investment in the United States and is understandably the most likely to
trigger foreign reprisals.
The New York proposals, made ostensibly to eliminate the competitive
advantages enjoyed by foreign banks, would operate to ease restraints which
apply to domestic banks, paving the way for the multi-state expansion of the
large New York banks. Under New York proposals, significant advantages
would accrue to New York banks, but many of the present regulatory problems
associated with foreign banks would be unaffected. Not all of the competitive
inequalities would be eliminated, and those foreign and monetary policy
.considerations related to the expansion of foreign bank activity would remain
similarly unresolved.
The Federal Reserve proposals represent a comprehensive and coherent
approach to regulatory reform which address each of the major problems
associated with the expansion of foreign banking in the United States. The
proposals are grounded in the principle of non-discrimination and would
achieve equality of treatment in the regulation and supervision of foreign and
domestic banks. Further, the proposal would bring foreign banks within the
purview of the central bank, increasing the efficiency of monetary policy and
making United States policies toward foreign banks responsive to various
foreign policy considerations.
State banking authorities may view the Federal Reserve proposals as
contributing to the erosion of the dual banking system, but it does not follow
that the loss of state control over certain aspects of foreign banking will weaken
or destroy the virtues of a decentralized system. Rather, we have seen how in
recent years the federal government has gradually expanded its jurisdiction over
certain banking activities which were more appropriately regulated at the
national level; this process has not seriously weaken the dual banking system
but has been a means of accommodating that system to a set of emerging
regulatory issues national in scope and most appropriately dealt by federal
regulatory agencies.
To the extent that the Federal Reserve proposals would provide essentially
similar treatment of foreign and domestic banks, it is hard to imagine that
foreign opposition to such measures would be extreme or that retaliatory
measures would be taken abroad. Foreign apprehensions should be largely
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alleviated by the inclusion of a grandfather clause protecting those foreign
banks already established in the United States. Of the three approaches to
regulatory reform here considered, the Federal Reserve proposals would deal
most effectively and fairly with the full range of problems which have
accompanied the expansion of foreign banking in the United States.
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